The recent trend for acquiring big data assumes that possessing quantitatively more and qualitatively finer data necessarily provides an advantage that may be critical in competitive situations. Using a model complex adaptive system where agents compete for a limited resource using information coarse grained to different levels, we show that agents having access to more and better data perform worse than others in certain situations. The relation between information asymmetry and individual payoffs is seen to be complex, depending on the composition of the population of competing agents. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.98.020301 Agents in a population often coordinate their actions with that of their neighbors, resulting in striking forms, such as in swarming and flocking [1, 2] . Typically, in such cases, individuals use information obtained from their local environment to adjust their actions in order to achieve some desired objective [3] [4] [5] [6] . Emergent coordination is therefore crucially dependent on the information acquired by an agent and its ability to process it appropriately, which determines its future course of action. Often the objectives of different agents in a system may not be compatible with each other, for instance, when they are competing for a limited resource. Examples of such situations are abundant in nature, where individuals vie for food, shelter, and mating opportunities. Even in our more complex social environment, we regularly come across instances of such competition [7] , e.g., choosing the least congested route through an urban road network [8, 9] or anticipating the relative demand for a financial asset so as to profit by buying or selling it [10, 11] . In these settings, individuals may use strategies which project information from past experiences to make decisions about the future course of action [12] [13] [14] . Conventional wisdom suggests that the relative success of an agent would increase with the quality and quantity of available data that would form the basis for its decisions. Indeed, the recent excitement about "big data" is partially based on the premise that access to more and better information provides a competitive advantage [15] .
Agents in a population often coordinate their actions with that of their neighbors, resulting in striking forms, such as in swarming and flocking [1, 2] . Typically, in such cases, individuals use information obtained from their local environment to adjust their actions in order to achieve some desired objective [3] [4] [5] [6] . Emergent coordination is therefore crucially dependent on the information acquired by an agent and its ability to process it appropriately, which determines its future course of action. Often the objectives of different agents in a system may not be compatible with each other, for instance, when they are competing for a limited resource. Examples of such situations are abundant in nature, where individuals vie for food, shelter, and mating opportunities. Even in our more complex social environment, we regularly come across instances of such competition [7] , e.g., choosing the least congested route through an urban road network [8, 9] or anticipating the relative demand for a financial asset so as to profit by buying or selling it [10, 11] . In these settings, individuals may use strategies which project information from past experiences to make decisions about the future course of action [12] [13] [14] . Conventional wisdom suggests that the relative success of an agent would increase with the quality and quantity of available data that would form the basis for its decisions. Indeed, the recent excitement about "big data" is partially based on the premise that access to more and better information provides a competitive advantage [15] .
In this Rapid Communication, we show that agents using quantitatively more data that are also finely resolved (and hence also qualitatively superior) may not actually do better-and can in fact do worse-in certain situations when they are competing with agents that have access to less, as well as lower-resolution, information. The surprising result arises from emergent coordination in the collective activity of agents who use information at a particular coarse graining (say, level X). This leads to macroscopic patterns of behavior that may be discernible from the data only at a different level of coarse graining (say, level Y ). Thus, if there are other agents in the population who have access to information about the system at this latter level Y , they can potentially exploit this predictability to their advantage. We also show that the relation between information asymmetry and the performance of agents is a complex one, depending on the relative fraction in the population of agents of each type. Thus, the utility of "big data" is contingent upon the precise nature of an agent's ecosystem comprising all its competitors. The premise that more and better information will automatically result in better performance, e.g., by improving predictive power, therefore needs to be treated with caution. This is especially true for competitive situations where adaptation through learning occurs, such as in financial markets [16, 17] .
To investigate how information asymmetry between agents affects their performance, we focus on a complex adaptive system where agents compete for a limited resource. Here, the heterogeneous agents use the different types of information that they have access to for the same purpose, viz., to have preferential access to the resource. In particular, we use the paradigm of the minority game (MG) [18] [19] [20] which has all the ingredients to address the above question in a quantitative manner. It also has the advantage that the classical version, in which all agents use the same coarse-grained information, is well understood and can be used as a benchmark for the more complex situation that is investigated here. We consider a population of an odd number N of agents who independently and simultaneously choose between two options (A and B, say) in each round. The option that is chosen by fewer agents is considered the better choice (outcome) in each round and leads to a higher payoff (say, 1), while those who had chosen the alternative receive a lower payoff (say, 0).
We assume that the population consists of different types of agents, each type having access only to data coarse grained to a particular level of resolution k (see Fig. 1 ). For clarity, we focus on the interaction between only two types of agents corresponding to the extremes of coarse graining, viz., the lowest resolution k = 2 (which we designate as type 1 agents) and the highest resolution k = N + 1 (type 2 agents). The former can only distinguish between N A > N/2 and N A < N/2 (i.e., whether A was chosen by the majority or not) in a A schematic representation of a complex adaptive system comprising N agents that are competing for a limited resource. Every agent has to choose between two possible actions (A or B) at each round, with the option chosen by the lesser number of agents being the better choice (outcome) in that round. Agents make decisions using strategies based on information about the collective choice in previous m rounds. The system can be in any of k possible states (2 k N + 1, depending on the level of coarse graining) at each round. Here, agents are distinguished into two classes (types 1 and 2) according to the two extreme levels of coarse-grained information, i.e., k = 2 and k = N + 1, respectively, that they have access to. After each round t, the information about the total number of agents choosing a specific action A (say), N A t , that is accessed only by type 2 agents, as well as binary information, viz., the choice of the minority (A or B) which is accessed only by type 1 agents, are added to the history of outcomes. The information about the outcome is also used as feedback for adaptive selection of strategies by the agents. particular round [18] while the latter can determine the exact number of agents N A opting for A in a round [21] . The memory length of each type of agent indicates the number of past rounds whose information they retain, and is denoted by m 1 (m 2 ) for a type 1 (type 2) agent. Each agent uses strategies that map the information about past events [m 1 bits for a type 1 agent, m 2 log 2 (N + 1) bits for a type 2 agent] to the choice of action in the next round (i.e., A or B). Each agent initially chooses at random a small sample of strategies (e.g., of size 2 as here) from the set of all possible strategies, which is of size 2 2 m 1 for a type 1 agent and 2 (N+1) m 2 for a type 2 agent. At each round, an agent scores the strategies according to the potential payoffs that would have been obtained by using them in the previous rounds (feedback), and uses the one having the highest score.
We first focus on the simplest case of a single type 1 agent with memory length m 1 interacting with a population of N −1 type 2 agents with memory length m 2 . One may naively expect that agent(s) having more information at their disposal (measured in bits) will have an advantage over the other type of agent(s). Consequently, it would have been expected that when the number of bits m 1 in the information accessible to the type 1 agents is less than m 2 log 2 (N + 1), the corresponding quantity for the type 2 agents, then the latter would have obtained a relatively higher payoff. This would also be in accordance with the intuitive notion that the highly resolved data of type 2 agents is qualitatively better than the low-resolution outcome data of type 1 agents. However, the mean payoffs of the two types of agents shown in Fig. 2 for different memory lengths m 1 and population sizes N reveals that the actual behavior is more complex.
The most surprising outcome for the case when the type 2 agents have memory length m 2 = 1 [ Fig. 2(a) ] is that the type 1 agent is able to acquire a relatively higher payoff at low values of m 1 even though the information accessible to it is highly coarse grained and quantitatively much less compared to the rest of the population. Moreover, the range of m 1 over which the type 1 agent does better than type 2 agents is seen to increase with N . Thus, the success of an agent in a complex adaptive system, where the information accessible by the individual entities differs both in terms of quality and quantity, is not entirely determined by the amount and resolution of the data at its disposal. Instead, as we show below, it depends more on whether discernible patterns in the behavior of the population are present at the level of coarse graining it has access to. When the memory length of the type 2 agents is increased to m 2 = 2 [ Fig. 2(b) ], the type 1 agent is no longer observed to have a higher payoff than the rest of the population, regardless of its memory length m 1 . Note that type 2 agents attain the highest degree of emergent coordination among themselves for m 2 = 2 independent of N [21] . Thus, it is not surprising that the lone type 1 agent will not be able to outperform the optimally coordinated population of type 2 agents. However, as we shall show below, introducing multiple type 1 agents makes it possible for these mutually competing individuals to develop emergent coordination within themselves by which they can outperform type 2 agents with m 2 = 2. If m 2 > 2, the behavior of the type 2 agents is indistinguishable from agents randomly choosing between A and B [21] . As there is no predictability in the time series available to the type 1 agent that it can exploit, it will on average receive essentially the same payoff as the rest of the population.
Note that the above results are in stark contrast to the case of a population comprising only type 1 agents, but where one or more agents have a larger memory length than others. When they have access to the same binary history of outcomes, it is known that the agents with smaller memory are always at a disadvantage when playing against a group of larger memory agents [22, 23] . Thus, the results reported here cannot be reproduced if we simply replace the type 2 agents with type 1 agents having quantitatively equivalent memory in terms of size (i.e., m 2 ∼ log 2 N ). Another important point to consider is that if the population is homogeneous, comprising only type 1 agents, it is known that the system behaves essentially identically even if the agents are provided with a random sequence instead of the endogenous history of past outcomes [24, 25] . Thus, the only requirement for the agents to display the collective dynamics observed in this system is that all of them possess the same information regardless of whether it is true or false. However, when the population consists of both type 1 and type 2 agents, replacing the actual history by random sequences coarse grained at different levels as appropriate for the different types of agents leads to a different outcome. For example, a single type 1 agent interacting with N − 1 type 2 agents no longer enjoys a relative advantage with regard to the rest of the population (see Supplemental Material [26] ) unlike what is observed when the agents are provided with the actual history [ Fig. 2(a) ].
To explain the relative performance of different types of agents having access to information at the two extreme levels of coarse graining, we focus on the information content in the history of outcomes that can be exploited by the agents to their advantage. As we shall see, the collective action of any one type of agents may result in predictable patterns at the other level of coarse graining and hence observable only to these other agents. This "useful" information content above the noise level can be quantified by measuring the predictability of a particular choice (say, A) being the outcome in a particular round, given the history of past outcomes. This history can be either the binary sequence of outcomes A, B or the detailed time series of the number of agents {N A t } choosing a particular option A, the former (latter) being accessible only to a type 1 (type 2) agent.
We can therefore define two distinct information measures, viz.,
Here, u L bin is the binary sequence of outcomes for the previous L bin rounds while u L det is the sequence of integers, each lying between 0 and N , representing the number of agents choosing A in the previous L det rounds. The probability with which a particular sequence of L successive outcomes is observed is denoted as P (u L ), while P (A|u L ) represents the conditional probability that the outcome A follows the sequence u L .
Let us consider a population comprising only type 2 agents having memory length m 2 . The collective behavior of such agents generates a history of binary outcomes whose information content H 1 is shown in Fig. 2(c) for m 2 = 1 and 2. Note that this information cannot be used by the type 2 agents themselves, whose strategies are based on u L det but is accessible in principle to a hypothetical type 1 agent whose strategies use u L bin . We observe that H 1 increases with the length of the binary sequence, L bin , over the range of sequence lengths considered here, with H 1 = 0 when the history is restricted to the immediately preceding round, i.e., L bin = 1. Thus, if a type 1 agent with memory length m 1 is introduced into this population, it can make use of the predictability present in the binary sequence accessible to it when m 1 > 1. As m 1 increases, the number of possible strategies that can be used by the type 1 agent increases exponentially (=2 2 m 1 ). It therefore becomes progressively less likely that the agent will randomly pick the strategy that can optimally exploit the predictability present in u L bin . This implies that the highest payoff for a type 1 agent is achieved for the lowest value of m 1 having nonzero information content, i.e., m 1 = 2, as is indeed confirmed by Fig. 2 .
The above arguments explain the performance of a single type 1 agent interacting with a population of agents of the other type [26] . However, in reality, the number of each type of agents having access to data at different levels of coarse graining can be arbitrary. We shall now consider the situation where the relative fraction of the two types of agents present in the population is varied between the two extreme cases considered earlier. Figure 3 shows the average payoffs P 1 , P 2 for a population of N agents of types 1 and 2, respectively, for different values of the fraction f 1 and memory length m 1 of type 1 agents, keeping the memory length of type 2 agents fixed [viz., m 2 = 1 for Fig. 3(a) , and =2 for Fig. 3(b) ]. As in Fig. 2 , here also we see that type 1 agents can outperform type 2 agents even when the quantity of information (m 1 bits) available to the former is much less than that for the latter [m 2 log 2 (N + 1) bits]. This is seen in the low m 1 region in Fig. 3 when f 1 is low, where the few type 1 agents receive a higher payoff than the more numerous type 2 agents. As f 1 → 0, we approach the case of a single type 1 agent (playing N − 1 type 2 agents) that achieves a maximum payoff at m * 1 = 2, which is indeed observed in Fig. 3 . On the other hand, when f 1 → 1, the maximum payoff should occur at m * 1 log 2 (0.337N ), as it is a conventional game between type 1 agents [27] . Indeed, for any fraction 0 < f 1 < 1 of type 1 agents, their best performance is achieved for a memory size m * 1 that lies between 2 and log 2 (0.337N ) (indicated by the dashed curves in Fig. 3) . Thus, multiple type 1 agents can achieve a higher individual payoff together than by playing singly against a population of type 2 agents, suggesting an important role of emergent coordination among a group of competing agents who are distinguished by the nature of the information available to them. Let us now consider the performance of the type 2 agents. When playing against type 1 agents with low memory length m 1 , type 2 agents achieve their highest payoff when f 1 → 1 [26] . In other words, it is important to have the size of the group to which detailed data is available as small as possible in order for them to achieve a maximum payoff in this regime of low m 1 . When more agents have access to this data (i.e., decreasing f 1 ), their payoff is eroded until they actually perform worse than the type 1 agents who have coarser-grained data. Thus, access to more and better data is not by itself a determining factor for success in a complex adaptive situation.
As the memory length m 1 of the type 1 agents increases, the optimal population fraction at which type 2 agents achieve the highest payoff decreases from the neighborhood of f 1 = 1. In fact, type 2 agents with m 2 = 2 (the optimal memory length for a population exclusively composed of such agents) achieve their best performance when f 1 → 0. Thus, in this high m 1 regime (m 1 6 for m 2 = 2), type 2 agents achieve high payoffs by dominating the population. By contrast, type 1 agents do better for large f 1 as a result of emergent coordination within their group. Indeed, in this regime, for any given m 1 , the payoff of type 1 agents increases with f 1 . Thus, the outcome is not symmetric for agents having access to information at the two extreme levels of coarse graining [28] .
We note here that concerns about the potential pitfalls of big data have been voiced earlier [29] . There have been several critical discussions from different perspectives [30] on how big data projects can fail through improper planning, e.g., as a result of unclear objectives or cost-related issues [31] . Another strand of literature deals with problems related to the analysis of big data in distributed computing frameworks [32] . In this Rapid Communication, however, a more fundamental mechanism is revealed which severely limits the value of big data analytics in competitive environments where agents can adapt their behavior based on information about past outcomes. As most socioeconomic phenomena of interest can be seen to be a result of interactions between agents in a complex adaptive system [33, 34] , the results reported here may play a key role in explaining the behavior observed in a variety of such systems.
To conclude, we have shown that information asymmetry among agents in a complex adaptive system can have surprising consequences. Specifically, in a system where agents compete for a scarce or limited resource using strategies based on information about the collective behavior in previous interactions, asymmetry arising from individuals having access only to data coarse grained to different levels can result in agents with more and better data performing worse than others under certain circumstances. Such counterintuitive effects arise from predictable patterns emerging in the collective information about the system at a certain level of coarse graining and thus discernible only to agents privy to that level. This provides them a competitive advantage when the population is dominated by agents of a different type who do not have access to the coarse-graining level at which such patterns generated by their own collective activity are apparent. The relation between the relative performance of the different types of agents and the nature of information asymmetry is therefore crucially dependent on the exact composition of the population to which they belong. Our results imply that striving to acquire and process ever increasing quantities of data in the hope of making more accurate predictions in complex adaptive systems, such as financial markets, may sometimes be counterproductive.
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